{"id":326,"date":"2020-01-28T09:26:00","date_gmt":"2020-01-28T09:26:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.calbaptist.edu\/cshb\/?p=326"},"modified":"2021-03-09T06:47:22","modified_gmt":"2021-03-09T06:47:22","slug":"religious-leaders-shared-reality-and-the-difficulty-of-change","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.calbaptist.edu\/cshb\/2020\/01\/28\/religious-leaders-shared-reality-and-the-difficulty-of-change\/","title":{"rendered":"Religious Leaders, Shared Reality, and the Difficulty of Change"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By Dr. Erin Smith<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Are you familiar with Jesus\u2019 parables in Matthew 13? The ones about the seeds falling in rocky soil, thorns, or good soil? Or about sowing weeds among seeds, or the size of a mustard seed plant? Among these verses, as Jesus explains why he speaks in parables, he says, \u201cBut blessed are your eyes because they see, and your ears because they hear. For truly I tell you, many prophets and righteous people longed to see what you see but did not see it, and to hear what you hear but did not hear it.\u201d (Matthew 13: 16-17). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why was it so hard for the religious leaders to open their ears and eyes? (And, related, why is it so easy for us to see that their ears are closed, but be blind to areas of our own deafness? See Matthew 7:3-5 if you don\u2019t believe that we are blind in this way.) <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Photo by Nathan Dumlao<\/a> on Unsplash<\/a> <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

As a psychologist, I think about this question in empirical\u2014testable, measurable\u2014terms. And it turns out that psychology has been investigating a variant of this question for the past 5 or 6 decades. When the question of hearing ears and seeing eyes is rephrased in psychological language, it might look something like this: how are incorrect beliefs revised; how are beliefs challenged and changed in such a way that we move closer to truth, and why do we so rarely see legitimate belief change in light of evidence? I think this is a fair rephrasing of Jesus\u2019 question because Jesus wasn\u2019t saying, \u201cblessed are you because you\u2019ve always believed the right thing\u201d, but rather, blessed are you because you remained open to\u2014and were thus changed by\u2014God\u2019s truth, despite the fact that it wasn\u2019t what you were originally thinking, expecting, or looking for. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The story that psychological research tells about belief revision, about the process of opening our ears and eyes, is nuanced. It turns out that the cognitive and social systems humans are equipped with and embedded in have particular operations that make belief revision especially difficult. Much of this nuance is explored in an area of psychology called motivated reasoning (see Kunda, 1990<\/a>) or, more recently, in the study of cultural cognition<\/a>. Although we might hope that the goal of human reasoning is accuracy (e.g., moving closer toward what is true, in reality), research in psychology shows that we all also engage in forms of motivated directional reasoning. Motivated reasoning refers to the process of evaluating arguments and evidence in such a way that we arrive at our preferred conclusion. That is, we engage with information in a way that allows us to preserve our beliefs, even in the face of data to the contrary. Maintenance of beliefs may be another goal of human reasoning, a goal that is sometimes at odds with the goal of accuracy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Photo by Ashley Batz<\/a> on Unsplash<\/a> <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

A considerable amount of research on motivated reasoning is nested within the context of politically-motivated reasoning (though religion is also an important factor that must be considered). For example, Campbell and Kay (2014)<\/a> demonstrated that motivated reasoning is due, in part, to an aversion to the solution implicated in the problem. If we don\u2019t like the solution, we are motivated to dismiss the problem (i.e., claiming that the data do not actually show a problem, that the problem is overstated, etc.). Crucially, Campbell and Kay demonstrated the explanatory power of solution aversion for Republicans and Democrats, albeit for different issues. Republicans and Democrats both dismissed issues when they were tied with solutions that countered typical conservative or liberal ideals. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Potentially more powerful in promoting motivated reasoning than solution aversion, however, is the connection of our beliefs to our identities. Shared Reality Theory proposes that \u201cexperience is established as valid and reliable to the extent that it is shared with others\u201d (Hardin & Higgins, 1996<\/a>, p. 28). That is, when we share beliefs with others, not only does that bond us with the other, but it also provides \u201cevidence\u201d of the reality of that belief. For example, research suggests that individuals were less likely to accept scientific arguments if they believed that their parents or friends did not accept those same arguments; accepting the argument would have threatened the reality shared within these relationships. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be clear, motivated reasoning is rarely (if ever) conscious. People rarely look at data, read articles, have a debate with a friend and think, \u201cI\u2019m going to take what they say and totally misinterpret it\u2026on purpose!\u201d No, that\u2019s not what happens. Rather, as a function of unconscious cognitive processes, we selectively remember, interpret, are critical of information in a way that protects our beliefs. If the evidence can be discounted (for presumably \u201cgood\u201d reasons), then our beliefs can continue unchanged and the social connections with whom we share these beliefs are maintained or even strengthened. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Photo by 30daysreplay (PR & Marketing)<\/a> on Unsplash<\/a> <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Think about the implications of this. When evidence comes to light that something that we believe might not be true, it\u2019s not just about the data. In fact, research in motivated reasoning indicates that exposure to data that suggests we might be wrong may, in some cases, polarizes belief, causing us to believe more <\/em>strongly despite the mounting evidence that the belief is wrong. Why is this? Our most important beliefs are inextricably intertwined with our most important social connections. Shared Reality Theory suggests that these relationships are important, in part, because of their connection to the beliefs shared within them; our relationships validate our beliefs and our shared beliefs solidify and strengthen our relationships. (It\u2019s a bit of a chicken-egg\/important belief-important relationship thing.) Considered in this light, changing beliefs also threatens to upend our most pivotal social connections and our understanding of what makes life meaningful. What shared reality suggests is that it is exceptionally difficult to change beliefs, especially some of our most important ones, because of the threat this change implies for our social world. This is true even when there is a lot of evidence that our beliefs are wrong. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n
\n